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735 
Whose Phone Line Is It Anyway: A Prosecutor’s Guide to 
Navigating the Evidentiary Gold Mine of Prison Phone 
Calls 
Introduction 
Prison phone calls offer a treasure trove of prospective evidence to be 
used in a criminal trial. Often, a defendant will make an incriminating 
statement on a prison phone call even after being warned that the calls may 
be recorded.1 Prosecutors can use the statements made in these phone calls 
in a wide variety of ways: to establish certain facts or events, to evaluate 
witness credibility, to impeach, to bolster their cases, or to corroborate 
additional evidence at trial. Individual party admissions may be easily 
admissible,2 while other more complicated statements, such as 
coconspirator statements, require additional steps prior to admission.3 This 
Comment provides prosecutors a comprehensive guide—paired with simple 
examples and solutions—to introduce prison phone calls into evidence and 
discusses the specific hurdles one must overcome to effectively filter 
through prison phone call statements. In addition, this Comment notes how 
courts may disagree on the interpretation of what it means for a statement to 
be “in furtherance of a conspiracy” once the coconspirator is incarcerated.4  
To begin, Part I of this Comment shows how the prison phone call 
system operates in the federal system. Part II explains the process of 
introducing a statement, avoiding the rule against hearsay, and provides 
examples to show how the hearsay exceptions apply to prison phone calls. 
Part III provides analysis of a few exceptions, giving a framework for 
prosecutors to use and emphasizes the ease of introducing this information 
while noting potential objections defense counsel may raise. Part IV 
provides the conclusive, overall procedure to consider prior to submitting 
the phone calls into evidence.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 1. See generally Amy Pavuk, Jail Phone Calls a Nightmare for Defense Attorneys, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 26, 2014), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2014-04-
26/news/os-jail-phone-call-used-against-you-20140426_1_jail-phone-calls-jailhouse-phone-
shellie-zimmerman. 
 2. See infra Section II.B.  
 3. See infra Section II.D.  
 4. See infra Section III.D. 
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I. How the Federal Phone System Operates  
The federal prison phone call system is heavily regulated.5 The Code of 
Federal Regulations governs federal prisons,6 but wardens maintain 
discretion in managing many aspects of the prisons, such as inmate contact 
with persons in the community through the use of telephones.7 Phone 
regulations are extremely favorable to the warden, who is only required to 
allow an inmate to make one phone call per month.8 The central purpose of 
phone privileges is to provide means for an inmate to maintain ties with 
family or community for personal development.9  
Prisons commonly limit the individuals an inmate can call10 and the 
prison must maintain a call list containing preapproved numbers.11 The 
Federal Bureau of Prisons (“Bureau”) attempted to require inmate-phone-
call recipients to provide personal information prior to the approval of the 
phone list, but the proposal was abandoned and amended to require that 
inmates concede “to the best of the inmate’s knowledge, the person or 
persons on the list are agreeable to receiving the inmate’s telephone call and 
that the proposed calls are to be made for a purpose allowable under Bureau 
policy or institution guidelines.”12 This leaves some discretion to the 
inmates and allows them the opportunity to contact individuals who may 
not be on the approved list, as prisons often do not have the adequate 
workforce and time to constantly keep up with these lists.13  
While a prison may ban the use of three-way calls for inmates, phone 
call recipients may utilize a three-way call, therefore sidestepping the 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See generally 28 C.F.R. §§ 540.100-105 (2015). 
 6. See generally id. § 0.95. 
 7. Id. § 540.100(a). 
 8. Id. § 540.100(b). A prison can restrict an inmate’s phone calls to an even greater 
extent if the inmate requires disciplinary sanctions. Id.; see also 3 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, 
RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 14:18 (4th ed. 2011). 
 9. 28 C.F.R. § 540.100(a); Stay in Touch, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop. 
gov/inmates/communications.jsp (last visited Mar. 29, 2017) (“We extend telephone 
privileges to inmates to help them maintain ties with their families and other community 
contacts.”). 
 10. 28 C.F.R. § 540.100(a); MUSHLIN, supra note 8, § 14:19. 
 11. 28 C.F.R. § 540.101 (providing a general call list estimate); MUSHLIN, supra note 8, 
§ 14:19. 
 12. Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1098 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 
540.101(a)(1)); MUSHLIN, supra note 8, § 14:19. 
 13. See Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A]llowing 
Valdez telephone access would have required the defendants to allocate additional resources 
to monitor his telephone conversations to ensure that he did not try to tip off his cohorts.”). 
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benefits of requiring a phone call list.14 Another situation arises where the 
phone call recipient can put another person on the line to speak to the 
inmate.15 This action may be planned, as where a mother puts her son on 
the line to speak to his father,16 or it can be unplanned, as where other 
people force their way onto the phone.17 In either event, additional 
authentication may be required to introduce these statements made by third-
party phone call recipients.18  
Many prisons record these phone calls and give proper notice to 
inmates19 so that calls might be monitored; and when an inmate uses the 
phone system, this establishes implied consent.20 The primary purpose of 
recording these calls is to maintain security, uphold orderly management, 
and provide protection to the public.21 Inmates may talk to a variety of 
individuals ranging from friends, family, coworkers, acquaintances, and 
significant others, thus presenting many opportunities for valuable 
evidence.  
To obtain this valuable evidence, a prosecutor must first secure leave of 
court and issue a subpoena on the prison to obtain the phone call 
recordings.22 Prison officials may view the subpoenas as “mere formalities” 
and will likely work hand in hand with the prosecution team.23 To ensure 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See Brutcher v. Cassady, No. 4:11CV1613 ACL, 2014 WL 4823952, at *11 (E.D. 
Mo. Sept. 26, 2014), for an example of a prison three-way call through a cell phone. 
 15. See, e.g., Martinez v. Biter, No. EDCV 14-1883 JGB (AS), 2015 WL 3407930, at 
*1-2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2015). 
 16. Id. at *1. 
 17. Id. at *1-2. 
 18. See FED. R. EVID. 901(a); United States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189, 1203-05 (9th Cir. 
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2350 (2015) (providing an example of a court’s analysis when 
authenticating prison phone call evidence). 
 19. See, e.g., United States v. Chaiban, No. 2:06-CR-00091-RLH-PAL, 2007 WL 
437704, at *8 (D. Nev. Feb. 2, 2007) (“The telephones play a ‘preamble’ which notifies the 
caller and the recipient that the call may be monitored and/or recorded. If the recipient 
wishes to accept the call, he or she presses the “0” key on the phone.”); Stay in Touch, supra 
note 9 (“A notice is posted next to each telephone advising inmates that calls are 
monitored.”). 
 20. Hill v. Donoghue, 815 F. Supp. 2d 583, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Where a prison 
gives notice to inmates that their calls may be monitored, inmates’ use of the prison’s 
telephones constitutes implied consent for the purposes of Title III.” (citing United States v. 
Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 19-20 (2d Cir. 1988)), aff’d, 518 F. App’x 50 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 21. 28 C.F.R. § 540.102(a) (2015). 
 22. United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480, 1494 (S.D. Fla. 1991); see also 
Chaiban, 2007 WL 437704, at *13 (“The public does not have access to inmate phone calls 
without a subpoena. Law enforcement does have access to the calls.”). 
 23. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. at 1493-94. 
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compliance with Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a 
prosecutor must be able to show she exerted a “genuine effort to obtain 
identifiable and relevant evidence.”24 Therefore, she must show what is 
believed to be on the tape, avoiding a wide-ranging “fishing expedition” for 
evidence.25 
 The vast pool of evidence provided by prison phone call recordings 
includes acquired statements, which may be used to impeach a witness, 
bypass spousal immunity, establish individual party admissions, and bring 
in coconspirator statements. An individual party admission or impeachment 
evidence may be easily introduced,26 while a coconspirator statement must 
clear additional hurdles.27 These party admissions are nonhearsay under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) and are easily admissible when offered 
against the party.28 Though also nonhearsay under 801(d), coconspirator 
statements have additional requirements—such as showing the statements 
were made by a party during and in furtherance of the conspiracy—that 
make using a prisoner’s statement against others more challenging.29 
II. Admitting Prison Phone Calls into Evidence 
While Congress has the power to legislate all rules of civil, criminal, 
appellate, and bankruptcy procedure alike, the rules of evidence have 
always been given adequate attention. The importance of evidentiary 
questions is deeply rooted in the legal system:  
[A]ll questions upon the rules of evidence are of vast importance 
to all orders and degrees of men: our lives, our liberty, and our 
property are all concerned in the support of these rules . . . and 
are now revered from their antiquity and the good sense in which 
they are founded.30 
For that reason, evidentiary rules warrant significant attention from courts. 
Look no further than a criminal trial: evidentiary rules often determine a 
defendant’s fate. 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. (citing Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 220-21 (1951); United 
States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
 25. Id. at 1492-93. 
 26. See infra Section II.B. 
 27. See infra Section II.D. 
 28. See infra Section II.B. 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290, 295 (1813). 
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Prison phone calls offer massive pools of potential evidence for 
prosecutors to use in criminal trials, but the necessary requirements for 
admitting certain statements are dense, detailed, and problematic. 
Prosecutors may not have ample time to filter through prison phone calls, 
so the following sections provide key statements and procedures to 
efficiently navigate prison phone call recordings.  
A. Opposing Party Statements  
To begin, opposing party statements offer the best route for bringing in 
evidence from a prison phone call when used against the party/defendant. 
Specifically, party-opponent admissions are exempted from the rule against 
hearsay based “on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the result 
of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the 
hearsay rule.”31 Two types of statements are likely to arise in a prison 
phone call: a statement “made by the party in an individual or 
representative capacity”32 or a statement “made by the party’s coconspirator 
during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”33 A coconspirator statement 
must clear additional evidentiary obstacles before being admissible in 
court.34  
B. Individual Admissions 
An individual admission made by a party-opponent is simple. For 
example, Albert is incarcerated and calls his friend Brandon through a 
prison phone line. Albert tells Brandon that he hid the murder weapon at 
Brandon’s house, but Brandon did not participate in the murder. This 
statement is not hearsay and is admissible as an individual party admission 
under 801(d)(2)(A).35  
Another easy way to utilize prison phone calls is to bypass the spousal 
communication privilege. Prison phone calls are monitored and spouses are 
made aware of the phone call recordings, therefore the privilege does not 
apply because it only protects statements made in confidence.36 While these 
                                                                                                                 
 31. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.  
 32. Id. 801(d)(2)(A). 
 33. Id. 801(d)(2)(E). 
 34. See infra Part III. 
 35. “A party’s own statement is the classic example of an admission.” FED. R. EVID. 
801(d)(2)(A) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules. 
 36. See United States v. Madoch, 149 F.3d 596, 602 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Janice admits she 
knew Larry was in jail while she was talking to him. Thus, because the marital 
communications privilege protects only communications made in confidence, under the 
unusual circumstances where the spouse seeking to invoke the communications privilege 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
740 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:735 
 
 
present the easiest way to bring in prison phone calls, adding a conspiracy 
can change the requirements of introducing statements made from prison 
phone lines. 
C. Understanding Hearsay 
Before jumping into coconspirator statements, a short background on 
hearsay is necessary to understand how and why coconspirator statements 
fall within a hearsay exception. Hearsay is defined as a statement37 that “(1) 
the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; 
and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in 
the statement.”38 Reading this definition alone makes it seem likely that 
prison phone calls are hearsay because they contain statements that were 
not made while testifying at trial that will be offered for their truth.39  
The Federal Rules of Evidence include a broad prohibition against using 
hearsay, save for exceptions, otherwise provided by statute, another rule of 
evidence, or any other rules set out by the Constitution and the Supreme 
Court.40 The purpose of the hearsay rule lies in its design: it serves to 
prevent unreliable hearsay from being admitted, but also permits reliable 
hearsay through one of the many exceptions laid out in the rules.41 The 
hearsay rule “is based on experience and grounded in the notion that 
untrustworthy evidence should not be presented to the triers of fact.”42 
                                                                                                                 
knows that the other spouse is incarcerated, and bearing in mind the well-known need for 
correctional institutions to monitor inmate conversations, we agree with the district court 
that any privilege Janice and Larry might ordinarily have enjoyed did not apply.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 37. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). A statement can be an oral or written assertion, or any 
nonverbal conduct, “if the person intended it as an assertion.” Id. 801(a). 
 38. Id. 801(c). 
 39. Cf. id. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules (“Admissions by 
a party-opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that their 
admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the 
conditions of the hearsay rule.”). Many inmates object to the admissibility of prison phone 
calls, claiming a violation of their Due Process and Fourth Amendment rights, but courts 
consistently decline these objections because the prisons provide proper notice and follow 
the procedure laid out by the Bureau. See generally United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 
15, 20-22 (2d Cir. 1988) (conducting a Fourth Amendment analysis); Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 
774 F. Supp. 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 1991) (conducting a Fifth Amendment due process analysis), 
rev’d on other grounds, 6 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, 515 U.S. 321 (1995). 
 40. FED. R. EVID. 802.  
 41. Ferrier v. Duckworth, 902 F.2d 545, 547 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 42. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973). 
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Courts usually exclude these out-of-court statements “because they lack the 
conventional indicia of reliability.”43 
 The foundation of the conspiracy theory hearsay exception rests on 
agency theory where “each member of a conspiracy is the agent of each of 
the other conspirators whenever he is acting.”44 The Court disfavors 
attempts “to broaden the already pervasive and wide-sweeping nets of 
conspiracy prosecutions.”45 These wide-sweeping nets can favor a 
prosecutor bringing in evidence of a conspiracy case because they may 
receive “some leeway to define the objectives of the conspiracy.”46  
D. Coconspirator Admissions  
For conspiracy cases, some statements taken from prison phone call 
recordings can become particularly tricky. These include party-opponent 
statements made “during and furtherance of the conspiracy.”47 If a 
prosecutor wants to introduce evidence against a coconspirator not yet 
incarcerated and on the other end of the phone line, he must establish three 
additional things before the evidence can be admitted: (1) that a conspiracy 
existed “in which [both] the declarant and defendant participated,” (2) the 
statement to be admitted was “made during the conspiracy,” and (3) the 
statement was “made in furtherance of the conspiracy.”48 For purposes of 
analyzing statements made over the phone, it is best to separate the first 
requirement into two preliminary foundational determinations, as they are 
discussed separately in Part III of this Comment. 
III. Phone Call Statements Made During the Course of and 
in Furtherance of the Conspiracy 
In a conspiracy, specifically a large conspiracy, it is reasonable to believe 
that fellow coconspirators might phone a friend who has been incarcerated. 
A common hearsay exception used to introduce prison phone calls concerns 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. 
 44. United States v. Perez, 989 F.2d 1574, 1577 (10th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (quoting 
United States v. Pallais, 921 F.2d 684 (7th Cir. 1990)). But see PAUL C. GIANNELLI, 
UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE § 32.10 (3d ed. 2009) (noting that agency theory “is a fiction” 
and the federal drafters failed to justify admissibility under an alternative theory related to 
trustworthiness of evidence in itself). 
 45. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 82 (1970) (quoting Grunewald v. United States, 353 
U.S. 391, 404 (1957)) (emphasizing the impact of limited scope in conspiracy prosecutions). 
 46. GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[B]. 
 47. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). 
 48. GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
742 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:735 
 
 
statements of an opposing party that “[were] made by the party’s 
coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”49 Rule 
801(d)(2)(E) allows “admission of statements by individuals acting in 
furtherance of a lawful joint enterprise.”50 Effectively, the rule operates by 
“denying admissibility to statements made after the objectives of the 
conspiracy have either failed or been achieved.”51 Prosecutors should give 
great attention to detail in conspiracy proceedings at the very beginning of 
the trial because the possibility of an appeal always lingers. Therefore, a 
prosecutor must have all her cards aligned. The standard of review plays an 
important role in how a prosecutor might be able to uphold her case on 
appeal, providing a great incentive to play all her cards at the trial level. 
Trial courts can act as the be-all and end-all for criminal proceedings 
because they receive an extensive level of discretion when making 
evidentiary rulings.52 If a case reaches review, the appellate courts examine 
the admission of evidence within the limited scope of the comprehensive 
record, determining whether the lower court abused its discretion.53 
Specifically, hearsay admissions by the trial courts are given a heightened 
level of deference while on review,54 and because it must be determined by 
the trial court that a coconspirator statement does not fit into hearsay, 
appellate courts may be reluctant to find an abuse of discretion.55  
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) contains “preliminary foundational determinations,” 
and those statements made in the course and in furtherance of a conspiracy 
are factual findings reviewed for clear error.56 When applying the clear 
error standard, courts “will not reverse a lower court’s finding of fact 
simply because [it] ‘would have decided the case differently.’ Rather, a 
                                                                                                                 
 49. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). 
 50. United States v. Brockenborrugh, 575 F.3d 726, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing United 
States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d 197, 201-02 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d 
413, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1983)) (acknowledging that the use of the word “conspiracy” is not 
required and could be a joint enterprise based off of agency principles).  
 51. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules. 
 52. See United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 873 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit 
applies a harmless error standard when reviewing trial courts’ rulings on 
hearsay objections resting solely on the Federal Rules of Evidence. A harmless 
error is one that does not have a substantial influence on the outcome of the 
trial; nor does it leave one in grave doubt as to whether it had such effect. 
Id. (citing United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1253-55 (10th Cir. 1991)). 
 56. United States v. Morgan, 748 F.3d 1024, 1036 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 
Ford v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 298 (2014). 
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reviewing court must ask whether, ‘on the entire evidence,’ it is ‘left with 
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’”57  
The standard for independent proof of a participation within a conspiracy 
is “lower than the standard of evidence sufficient to submit a charge of 
conspiracy to the jury,”58 where “the trial court must view the evidence as a 
whole, rather than consider the individual pieces in isolation,”59 and once 
the existence of the conspiracy has been proven, the evidence required to 
link other defendants “need not be overwhelming.”60 This standard means 
that it is especially important for prosecutors to ensure they introduce all 
pertinent phone calls at trial because once they meet the initial hurdle of 
showing the preliminary foundational determinations for a conspiracy, the 
clear error standard will not likely overturn the conviction.61  
Before addressing the preliminary questions, prosecutors should 
determine which individual statements will be brought into evidence. The 
prosecutor has the upper hand here by being able to prepare an argument 
ahead of time for each individual statement. But defense counsel has to play 
a “guessing game” and become familiar with the statements to object at the 
trial court level.62 The opportunity for defense counsel to object at the trial 
level is crucial to their case because of the heightened level of discretion 
given to trial courts in admitting this evidence,63 and the “clearly 
erroneous” standard on appeal is difficult to overcome.64 Therefore, 
prosecutors should do all that they can to bring in whatever statements they 
may have.  
                                                                                                                 
 57. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (first quoting Anderson v. Bessemer 
City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985); then twice quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 
U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). 
 58. United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. 
Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1981)).  
 59. Id. (citing United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1300 (2d Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1121 (2d Cir. 1969)). 
 60. Id. (quoting United States v. Provenzano, 615 F.2d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 61. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57. 
 62. A defendant must make a request pursuant to Rule 16(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure to obtain these phone calls. See United States v. Sanchez-Garcia, 685 
F.3d 745, 755 (8th Cir. 2012), for an example of how the Eighth Circuit reviews the 
disclosure of jailhouse audio recordings obtained by the government. 
 63. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
 64. See supra text accompanying note 56. A cautionary note for prosecutors: “[I]f the 
evidence is admitted over objection,” defense counsel will likely “try to convince the jury 
that the statement is untrustworthy and therefore should be accorded little weight.” James A. 
George, Hearsay: Recognizing It and Handling the Objection, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 489, 
492 (1987). 
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If an opposing party objects to the statement’s admission under Rule 
801(d)(2)(E), a court must answer preliminary questions to ensure that the 
statement falls within the rule’s definition.65 Thus, the prosecutor must 
prepare an argument to support these statements prior to any objection. 
Defense counsel will likely make a hearsay objection, so courts will begin 
by evaluating whether the statement is hearsay, and if it is, courts will 
require prosecutors to show the statement meets four preliminary questions 
before admitting the statements under the coconspirator exception.66 These 
questions can be viewed as separate elements that must be met by a 
preponderance of the evidence standard; therefore, the trial court must 
determine “(1) that a conspiracy existed; (2) the declarant and the party 
against whom the statement is offered were members of the conspiracy; (3) 
the statement was made in the course of the conspiracy; and (4) the 
statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy.”67 Each of these 
elements will be compared with specifics examples of what is required to 
meet them, and will be paired with applications to the prison phone call 
system in the following sections.  
A. First Element: Establishing the Existence of a Conspiracy  
This first element to establish the existence of a conspiracy can be easily 
met. A conspiracy only requires “an agreement between two or more 
persons . . . with an intent to commit a crime.”68 At common law, the 
conspiracy required independent proof to establish its existence,69 but in 
Bourjaily v. United States—a prominent case concerning admissible 
hearsay—the Court abolished this requirement.70 This ruling was later 
codified into the rule itself: “The statement must be considered but does not 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987). When deciding preliminary 
questions, the court is not obliged to follow any evidence rules, except those on privilege. 
FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
 66. United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 333 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 67. Id.; see also Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175. Some courts combine the third and fourth 
elements as a statement “made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy." United States v. 
Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 404, 406 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 
1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1978)). 
 68. GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[A]. 
 69. Id. § 32.10[D] (“[T]he statement itself could not be used to determine whether a 
conspiracy existed.”). 
 70. 483 U.S. at 181-82 (ruling that the trial court had correctly found an existing 
conspiracy and opining that “co-conspirator’s statements [can] themselves be probative of 
the existence of . . . and participation . . . in the conspiracy”); GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 
32.10[D]. 
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by itself establish . . . the existence of the conspiracy.”71 After the 
amendment, it is generally accepted that the statement made by a 
coconspirator “could be used to establish the existence of a conspiracy,” but 
it is not sufficient.72 Since Bourjaily and the 1997 amendment, courts may 
look toward independent corroborating evidence in affirming trial court 
decisions.73  
If the court considers conspiracy statements themselves while making 
preliminary factual determinations, these “statements are presumptively 
unreliable and, for such statements to be admissible, there must be some 
independent corroborating evidence of the defendant’s participation in the 
conspiracy.”74 United States v. Abu-Jihaad provides an example of how to 
avoid relying on the conspiracy statement itself as the court stated that the 
case exemplified “what the ‘during the course of’ and independent 
corroboration requirements are designed to catch,” because the sole 
evidence of the defendant’s conspiracy participation was the statement 
itself.75 In Abu-Jihaad, pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the government 
moved to admit certain statements made by a third party “five years after 
the events that form[ed] the basis of the charges against” the defendant.76 
The court considered the statements and additional evidence, but refused to 
find the defendant had entered into a conspiracy, because no additional 
corroborating evidence existed to establish the defendant’s participation in 
a conspiracy.77 Thus, those statements were not made “during the course” 
of a conspiracy.78  
                                                                                                                 
 71. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2); see also GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[D]. 
 72. United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1361 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 73. See, e.g., United States v. Zambrana, 841 F.2d 1320, 1346 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 74. United States v. Tellier, 83 F.3d 578, 580 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted) (citing 
Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 179); United States v. Clark, 18 F.3d 1337, 1341-42 (6th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1386 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Bentvena, 319 
F.2d 916, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1963)). “‘Some’ independent evidence is not merely a scintilla, 
but rather enough to rebut the presumed unreliability of hearsay. Admissibility of the 
hearsay, therefore, hinges on whether some sufficiently corroborating evidence exists which 
overcomes the suspected unreliability of out-of-court statements.” Clark, 18 F.3d at 1342 
(citing United States v. Silverman, 861 F.2d 571, 579 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
 75. 531 F. Supp. 2d 289, 298 (D. Conn. 2008) (noting the similarity of the case to 
Tellier and thus reaching the same conclusion). 
 76. Id. at 295 (emphasizing those statements as being only one example of many). 
 77. Id. at 298. 
There simply is no independent evidence that corroborates Mr. Abu-jihaad’s 
participation in a conspiracy with Mr. Shareef in early October 2006. That is 
made plain from the fact that the Government’s opening brief relied solely 
upon Mr. Shareef’s own statements to prove the existence of the conspiracy in 
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B. Second Element: Establishing Membership of the Conspiracy Between 
the Declarant and the Party Against Whom the Statement Is Offered 
Prosecutors must be able to show that “both the declarant and the 
defendant were members of the conspiracy”79 at the time the statement was 
made. When determining this, the analysis is similar to that used to 
establish the existence of a conspiracy.80 It is generally thought that once 
the declarant has been arrested, his participation in the conspiracy has 
terminated, therefore rendering his post-arrest statement inadmissible 
against a defendant.81 This becomes particularly relevant when trying to 
establish the third element—a statement being made during the course of 
the conspiracy—which is discussed in detail in the following section. It is 
entirely possible, however, for a conspiracy to continue while 
incarcerated.82 Thus, prosecutors focus first on the declarant as being a 
member of the conspiracy.  
The declarant has many opportunities to join or withdraw from the 
conspiracy during the defendant’s incarceration, and the defendant need not 
know of the declarant’s status during a phone call.83 Courts seem to put the 
most emphasis on illustrating separate arguments for both the declarant and 
the defendant, showing they were members of an ongoing conspiracy while 
the statement was made.84 In addition, “[T]he court[s] can look at the 
substance of the challenged co-conspirator testimony, as well as 
independent evidence, to determine whether or not [the party] was a 
participant in the conspiracy.”85 This broad, sweeping language 
demonstrates how far courts will go to find supporting evidence and seems 
to favor prosecutors. The language also supports and provides another 
example of why prosecutors should always exploit their ability to 
corroborate evidence: it will more likely help than hurt them on review.  
                                                                                                                 
early October 2006. 
Id. at 296. 
 78. Id. at 298. 
 79. GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[A]. 
 80. See generally Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987). 
 81. GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[A]. 
 82. Id. § 32.10[A] n.104. 
 83. See United States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d 1296, 1301 (11th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging 
that declarations of a coconspirator are “admissible against members of the conspiracy who 
joined after the statement was made.” (quoting United States v. Tombrelo, 666 F.2d 485, 
491 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
 84. See, e.g., Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 618 (1953); United States v. Cruz, 
797 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1986); see also GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[A]. 
 85. United States v. Allison, 908 F.2d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1990). 
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To determine whether the declarant or defendant was a member of the 
conspiracy, prosecutors and courts can look to several areas. To show 
membership in a conspiracy, “each coconspirator need not know of or have 
contact with all other members, nor must they know all of the details of the 
conspiracy or participate in every act in furtherance of it.”86 In fact, 
evidence of another separate conspiracy can help provide a basis for 
admitting a coconspirator statement.87 Additionally, “[p]articipation in a 
criminal conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; a common 
purpose or agreement to accomplish an unlawful objective may be inferred 
from a ‘development and a collocation of circumstances.’”88 A “single 
overt act by the defendant” may also be sufficient.89 The identification of 
the declarant is not required and “[s]ometimes evidence, usually 
circumstantial in nature, will convince the trial judge that it is more likely 
than not that an unidentified declarant was a participant in a conspiracy 
together with the party against whom the declarant’s assertion has been 
offered.”90 While identification is not required for the declarant, it is in the 
prosecutor’s best interest to try and authenticate the declarant’s identity.91 
Some prosecutors may face large conspiracy cases, and these may be 
analyzed differently in determining if the declarant and defendant were 
members of the conspiracy. These large and complex conspiracy cases can 
make it “inconvenient or impossible for the Government to prove the 
existence of the conspiracy and/or the participation therein of each of the 
alleged co-conspirators, prior to seeking admission of a co-conspirator’s 
statement.”92 To remedy this, the government has an obligation prior to the 
close of the case to prove the existence of the conspiracy for each 
individual coconspirator.93 This also favors prosecutors, as they may gain 
additional evidence throughout the trial concerning the identification of 
those coconspirators on the phone. The next two elements concern the 
strategic and fundamental elements when answering the preliminary 
questions to admit coconspirator statements. These are key because the 
                                                                                                                 
 86. United States v. Martínez-Medina, 279 F.3d 105, 113 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 87. United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2002) (adding that the separate 
conspiracy can be larger than the conspiracy charged). 
 88. United States v. Pack, 773 F.2d 261, 265-66 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting Glassner v. 
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942)). 
 89. United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489, 1500 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Pack, 
773 F.2d at 266). 
 90. DAVID F. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK § 35:12 (4th ed. 2011). 
 91. See supra text accompanying note 18. 
 92. United States v. Giampa, 904 F. Supp. 235, 286 (D.N.J. 1995). 
 93. Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1360-61 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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defense will most likely challenge these statements and it may be difficult 
in some situations to show an ongoing conspiracy while a defendant 
remains incarcerated.  
C. Third Element: Establishing a Statement Made During the Course of the 
Conspiracy  
When examining whether a statement was made during the course of the 
conspiracy, the prosecutor must consider the agreement of the conspiracy 
and the objective of the conspiracy.94 In turn, the court will “carefully 
ascertain the nature and extent of a conspiracy in determining whether acts 
or statements can properly be viewed as made during its existence.”95 This 
requirement illustrates why the drafters of the federal rules decided to base 
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) on agency theory, stating their intent as being “consistent 
with the position of the Supreme Court in denying admissibility to 
statements made after the objectives of the conspiracy have either failed or 
been achieved.”96 This shows that the object of the conspiracy is crucial to 
determine whether an act was made during the course of the conspiracy. 
Luckily, prosecutors may have some flexibility in defining the main 
objective of the conspiracy.97 
Generally, the conspiracy ends upon completion or failure to complete 
the main or central conspiratorial objectives.98 The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly rejected the argument that an “implicit subsidiary phase” 
automatically begins after completion with the sole objective of concealing 
the conspiracy.99 An early example of the Court’s rejection of this argument 
began with Krulewitch v. United States,100 where “the Court rejected the 
government’s argument that statements made after the main objective of the 
conspiracy had been achieved were nonetheless admissible if made to 
conceal the crime.”101 Krulewitch pointed out that if the Court adopted the 
government’s argument, it could cause “far-reaching results” and risk an 
unnecessary expansion of the rule against hearsay, leading to most, if not 
all, statements potentially being construed as a statement made to prevent 
                                                                                                                 
 94. GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[B]. 
 95. United States v. Perez, 989 F.2d 1574, 1579 (10th Cir. 1993) (keeping in mind the 
limited scope set by the Court for hearsay exceptions). 
 96. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed 
rules).  
 97. GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[B]. 
 98. See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 400 (1957). 
 99. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1949). 
 100. Id. at 442-43. 
 101. Perez, 989 F.2d at 1579. 
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detection, punishment, or made to shield fellow coconspirators.102 While 
this may be an unfavorable ruling for prosecutors, it does not impede their 
ability to prove such a statement in a prison phone call setting thanks to the 
Court’s subsequent decision in Lutwak v. United States.103 
In applying the teaching of Krulewitch, the Lutwak Court further 
enumerated the limits of admitting coconspirator declarations.104 This 
distinction is essential: 
Relevant declarations or admissions of a conspirator made in the 
absence of the co-conspirator, and not in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, may be admissible in a trial for conspiracy as against 
the declarant to prove the declarant’s participation therein. The 
court must be careful at the time of the admission and by its 
instructions to make it clear that the evidence is limited as 
against the declarant only. Therefore, when the trial court admits 
against all of the conspirators a relevant declaration of one of the 
conspirators after the conspiracy has ended, without limiting it to 
the declarant, it violates the rule laid down in Krulewitch. Such 
declaration is inadmissible as to all but the declarant.105 
This situation will only apply to prosecutors when the coconspirator arrest 
ends the conspiracy for the incarcerated. For example, Albert and Brandon 
were members of a conspiracy to kill Charlie. Albert is incarcerated for 
shoplifting and makes a phone call to Brandon. Assume incarceration has 
ended Albert’s participation in achieving the conspiracy’s objective to kill 
Charlie because he can no longer participate in the conspiracy. Brandon 
tells Albert that the plan to kill Charlie is still ongoing and further discloses 
details of the conspiracy’s plan to commit this crime all while Albert simply 
acknowledges these statements. Krulewitch only allows Brandon’s 
statements to be used to show his participation in the conspiracy—not 
Albert’s participation. When this occurs, the usefulness of the statement is 
necessarily marginalized. 
Krulewitch still applies today, though many courts have clarified certain 
characteristics regarding the concealment phase of the conspiracy.106 
Shortly after the decision in Krulewitch, the Supreme Court addressed yet 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 444-45. 
 103. 344 U.S. 604 (1953). 
 104. Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 618. 
 105. Id. at 615. 
 106. GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[B]. 
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another case concerning the admission of conspirator statements.107 The 
Court in Grunewald v. United States reaffirmed the Krulewitch standard in 
a short opinion.108 Justice Jackson thereafter clarified the Court’s 
expectations in his concurring opinion.109 Jackson boiled down the 
government’s argument as follows: “a conspiracy to conceal is being 
implied from elements which will be present in virtually every conspiracy 
case, that is, secrecy plus overt acts of concealment.”110 He then dismissed 
this argument again because it attempted to broaden the narrow rule.111 But 
he did not rule out the possibility that acts of concealing a conspiracy could 
carry weight in the furtherance requirement.112 And courts have given this 
weight;113 therefore prosecutors should assert that concealment of a 
conspiracy plays a meaningful role in satisfying the “in furtherance” 
requirement. 
Switching back to the main object of a conspiracy, it is presumed that the 
conspiracy continues until completion of the main objective114 or an 
affirmative showing of termination or withdrawal from the conspiracy.115 
“[W]here a conspiracy contemplates a continuity of purpose and a 
continued performance of acts, it is presumed to exist until there has been 
an affirmative showing that it has terminated; and its members continue to 
be conspirators until there has been an affirmative showing that they have 
withdrawn.”116 Postponing the main objective of the conspiracy or slowing 
down the process does not explicitly show termination of the conspiracy.117 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). 
 108. Id. at 399. 
 109. See id. at 400-24 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 110. Id. at 404. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 405 (“By no means does this mean that acts of concealment can never have 
significance in furthering a criminal conspiracy. But a vital distinction must be made 
between acts of concealment done in furtherance of the main criminal objectives of the 
conspiracy, and acts of concealment done after these central objectives have been attained, 
for the purpose only of covering up after the crime.”). 
 113. See, e.g., United States v. Hong Vo, 978 F. Supp. 2d 49, 55-57 (D.D.C. 2013); 
United States v. Alberico, 559 F.3d 24, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Justus, 162 
F.3d 1157 (4th Cir. 1998), 1998 WL 546095 at *6. 
 114. United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 253 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 115. United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 660 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 116. United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1268 (6th Cir. 1982) (alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 642-43 (6th Cir. 1975)). 
 117. Ammar, 714 F.2d at 253. 
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In addition, the arrest of one of the conspirators or the principal member 
does not automatically terminate participation in the conspiracy.118 
The defendant bears the burden of showing withdrawal from a 
conspiracy by proving an “attempt to undo the wrong that has been done in 
one of two ways”: (1) “giv[ing] authorities information with sufficient 
particularity to enable the authorities to take some action to end the 
conspiracy”; or (2) “communicat[ing] his withdrawal directly to his 
coconspirators in a manner that reasonably and effectively notifies the 
conspirators that he will no longer be included in the conspiracy.”119 “The 
second method ‘requires more than implied dissociation. It must be 
sufficiently clear and delivered to those with authority in the conspiracy 
such that a jury could conclude that it was reasonably calculated to make 
the dissociation known to the organization.’”120 Overall, the burden is high 
on the defendant to prove withdrawal from the conspiracy. If the defendant 
is incarcerated, however, the prosecutor is likely to bear the burden of 
proving the defendant was not terminated from the conspiracy and did not 
withdraw from the conspiracy merely by being incarcerated.  
The main objective of a conspiracy informs how far a conspiracy may 
continue.121 Stemming from the Court’s reluctance in Krulewitch and 
Grunewald to broadly admit implicit subsidiary agreements to conceal a 
conspiracy (paired with the presumption of continuation), lower courts may 
carefully reason through each statement with a critical eye to ensure the 
party has met its high burden.122 Courts determine the duration of a 
conspiracy on a case-by-case basis,123 and the “nature of the crime” is 
relevant.124 For example, in a conspiracy to kidnap, the conspirators had a 
central purpose to kidnap, obtain money, and then divide the proceeds 
amongst the coconspirators.125 The admitted phone call contained 
statements discussing concerns over the proceeds, furthering the central 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. 
 119. United States v. Randall, 661 F.3d 1291, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 120. United States v. Morgan, 748 F.3d 1024, 1037 (10th Cir.) (quoting Randall, 661 
F.3d at 1295), cert. denied sub nom. Ford v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 298 (2014). 
 121. See Mark Lippman, Defending Against the Co-Conspirator Hearsay Exception, 
CHAMPION, Aug. 1997, at 16, 18. 
 122. See id. at 17-18 (“The timing of the subsidiary agreement is crucial, and the 
government bears the burden of proving it was formed during the principal conspiracy.”). 
 123. United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1362 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Lippman, 
supra note 121, at 18. 
 124. Lippman, supra note 121, at 18. 
 125. Morgan, 748 F.3d at 1036. 
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purpose for kidnapping for money.126 The court stated that “[i]t is well 
settled that the distribution of the proceeds of a conspiracy is an act 
occurring during the pendency of the conspiracy.”127 When the “general 
objective of the conspirators is money, the conspiracy does not end, of 
necessity, before the spoils are divided among the miscreants.”128 This type 
of call can apply to a prison phone call as well. Taking the kidnapping 
example from above and applying it to Albert and Brandon again, Albert 
may need money to support his incarceration and therefore calls Brandon to 
discuss distributions of the proceeds from their kidnapping escapade. These 
statements occur during the concealment phase of the conspiracy, but are 
admissible under the exception because Albert and Brandon are pursuing 
the main objective of conspiracy—to obtain money—even while Albert is 
incarcerated. 
The most important concern a prosecutor may face is to show the court 
that incarceration or arrest of one or more coconspirators, the principal 
member, or even all but one member of the conspiracy does not necessarily 
cause the conspiracy to end.129 In some cases, “[i]f the conspiracy is 
ongoing, assertions made by the remaining conspirators may be introduced 
against the one arrested, though made after the arrest.”130 For example, in 
United States v. Marques, Marques was arrested and convicted for a 
conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine.131 Upon review, Marques 
challenged evidence admitted “after he allegedly dropped out of the 
conspiracy,”132 contending that “when he abandoned the venture, was 
arrested and cooperated with the authorities, the conspiracy ended as to 
him, and all acts and declarations by other conspirators thereafter should 
not have been considered in assessing his guilt.”133 But the court rejected 
his argument, stating that “[t]he acts and declarations of coconspirators, 
done or made in furtherance of the conspiracy, are admissible against a 
conspirator whose participation has terminated because of arrest.”134 
Therefore, while Marques stated that he had abandoned the venture, his acts 
                                                                                                                 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. (quoting United States v. Davis, 766 F.2d 1452, 1458 (10th Cir. 1985)). 
 128. United States v. Knuckles, 581 F.2d 305, 313 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing United States v. 
Floyd, 555 F.2d 45, 48 n.10 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583, 591 (2d 
Cir. 1971)). 
 129. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82. 
 130. BINDER, supra note 90, § 35:11. 
 131. 600 F.2d 742, 743 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 132. Id. at 745. 
 133. Id. at 750. 
 134. Id. (citing United States v. Wentz, 456 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1972)). 
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reflected a different conclusion and he failed to convince the court as to any 
reasons to be treated differently.135 Unfortunately, the court did not delve 
into what acts Marques committed that warranted their conclusion in spite 
of his statements of abandoning the conspiracy. The court seemed reluctant 
to adopt Marques’s argument, as it would limit the coconspirator 
participation in the conspiracy after arrest, as discussed in the following 
paragraph. 
Marques relied on the decision in Sandez v. United States, where the 
court believed that “the moment of any conspirator’s arrest is decisive as to 
him, even if it should be maintained that the arrest of the first conspirator is 
not conclusive as to all.”136 In addition, the arrested conspirator may believe 
that “the conspiracy has been thwarted, and presumably no other overt act 
contributing to the conspiracy can possibly take place at least so far as the 
arrested conspirator is concerned.”137 The Sandez court looked to an older 
Supreme Court case, Fiswick v. United States,138 where the Court “laid 
down the rule that although the result of the conspiracy may be a continuing 
one, the conspiracy itself does not become a continuing one.”139 Therefore a 
“[c]onfession or admission by one coconspirator after he has been 
apprehended is not in any sense a furtherance of the criminal enterprise.”140 
This can be interpreted as an example of courts trying to preclude the use of 
statements made after a coconspirator has been arrested.  
These cases can be compared with the outcome in United States v. 
Grubb.141 There, the court noted “ample evidence for the district court to 
find that the conspiracy had continued after the . . . arrests.”142 “In the 
absence of definite proof, [a] withdrawal from the conspiracy, or [an] 
abandonment of it, will not be presumed.”143 The “[a]rrest of some co-
conspirators does not, as a matter of law, terminate a conspiracy.”144 The 
arrests in Grubb did not end the conspiracy but merely made the 
participants more cautious.145  
                                                                                                                 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 750 n.4 (quoting Sandez v. United States, 239 F.2d 239, 243 (9th Cir. 1956)). 
 137. Sandez, 239 F.2d at 243. 
 138. 329 U.S. 211 (1946). 
 139. Sandez, 239 F.2d at 243 (discussing Fiswick). 
 140. Id. at 244 (quoting Fiswick, 329 U.S. at 217).  
 141. 527 F.2d 1107 (4th Cir. 1975). 
 142. Id. at 1109. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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In another case using arrests to determine the continuation of a 
conspiracy, the court concluded that “[t]he fact that Urrego and one of his 
co-conspirators were arrested did not necessarily mean that the conspiracy 
was terminated.”146 Urrego argued “that since he and Restrepo already had 
been apprehended and the cocaine seized, the statements made by Rivera 
during the monitored telephone conversations were outside of the course of 
the conspiracy.”147 Yet the court concluded “[t]here was ample evidence for 
the district court to conclude that Rivera’s statements were made in the 
course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”148 The defendants made 
similar arguments to those in Marques.149 Nonetheless, courts remain 
unsympathetic, especially to those continuing to oversee the conspiracy 
while incarcerated.150 In short, a prosecutor will want to gain a feel for her 
circuit’s stance on whether an arrest ends the conspiracy or whether it can 
continue under certain circumstances. Even if the court seems reluctant to 
reject the argument, the prosecutor should push the issue anyway. 
D. Fourth Element: Establishing a Statement Made in Furtherance of the 
Conspiracy  
The requirements that a statement must be made during the course of the 
conspiracy and in furtherance of the conspiracy are closely linked151 such 
that a prosecutor will often find himself aggregating the evidence. 
Unfortunately, “[n]o talismanic formula exists for ascertaining whether a 
particular statement was intended by the declarant to further the 
conspiracy.”152 Rather, “this determination must be made by examining the 
context in which the challenged statement was made.”153 Courts split on the 
application of this element,154 but on review, the standard of construction 
                                                                                                                 
 146. United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 1240 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Grubb, 
527 F.2d at 1109). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 743-50 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 150. See United States v. Babb, 369 F. App’x 503, 510 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 151. United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 253 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 152. United States v. Heidarpour, No. CR-11-109-M, 2012 WL 2825810, at *1 (W.D. 
Okla. July 10, 2012) (quoting United States v. Perez, 989 F.2d 1574, 1578 (10th Cir. 1993)). 
 153. Id. (quoting Perez, 989 F.2d at 1579). 
 154. See Perez, 989 F.2d at 1578. Compare United States v. Ciresi, 697 F.3d 19, 28-30 
(1st Cir. 2012) (applying a broad construction of the “in furtherance” requirement), and 
United States v. Kocher, 948 F.2d 483, 485 (8th Cir. 1991) (maintaining that the “in 
furtherance” requirement be construed broadly), with United States v. Rutland, 705 F.3d 
1238, 1252 (10th Cir. 2013) (highlighting the four kinds of statements the Tenth Circuit 
finds to satisfy the “in furtherance” requirement), and United States v. Johnson, 927 F.2d 
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should minimally affect evidentiary rulings due to the high level of 
discretion given to trial courts.155  
Courts tend not to apply the “in furtherance” requirement strictly because 
it would defeat the purpose of the hearsay exception.156 For example, in one 
conspiracy charge for possession with intent to distribute, the Fifth Circuit 
considered statements made from one conspirator to another coconspirator 
identifying another fellow coconspirator as the purchaser of marijuana to be 
statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy.157 As the Fifth Circuit 
reasoned, “It has been held that a statement by a person acting as a 
connection informing the ultimate purchaser of the identity of the source is 
a statement in furtherance of the conspiracy.”158 The burden is not high to 
meet here and often, if all the other elements are met, courts might be 
willing to stretch their views to meet this last requirement. Thus, these 
decisions tend to favor the prosecution. 
A statement furthers a conspiracy if it promotes the conspiracy’s main 
objectives or furthers the conspiracy’s goals in some way.159 Generally, 
narratives or narrative declarations of past events between coconspirators 
are not considered to be in furtherance of the conspiracy, but statements 
that reflect future intent to “set transactions integral to the conspiracy in 
motion and maintain the information flow among coconspirators” do meet 
the requirement.160 Return to the example with Albert and Brandon: Albert 
is incarcerated for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. Albert 
and Brandon are both members of a large drug-trafficking conspiracy run 
by a prominent drug lord that the federal government is trying to take down. 
Albert calls Brandon to tell him that he made arrangements with other 
inmates to distribute cocaine after he is released on bail. This statement can 
be considered to be “in furtherance of the conspiracy” because Albert 
arranged to further distribute cocaine in connection with the large drug- 
                                                                                                                 
999, 1001-02 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasizing the limitations on admitting co-conspirator 
statements and adhering to a narrow construction of the “in furtherance” requirement). But 
see United States v. Cornett, 195 F.3d 776, 782-85 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying a mixed level 
of construction using strict and broad language).  
 155. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.  
 156. United States v. Patton, 594 F.2d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. 
McMurray, 34 F.3d 1405, 1412 (8th Cir. 1994) (favoring admissibility); United States v. 
Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838, 845 (3d Cir. 1984) (using a broad interpretation). 
 157. Patton, 594 F.2d at 447 (noting that statements unnecessary to the conspiracy can be 
held to further the conspiracy). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Perez, 989 F.2d at 1578. 
 160. United States v. Roberts, 14 F.3d 502, 514-15 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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trafficking conspiracy case, and therefore the statement is admissible. Other 
examples showing statements to be in furtherance of the conspiracy include 
statements that identify other conspiracy members, describe roles within the 
conspiracy, induce conspiracy enlistment, further participation in group 
activities, reassure the existence of a conspiracy, dispel fears or suspicions, 
and keep members up-to-date on conspiracy activities.161 
Casual conversations made between coconspirators without the intent to 
encourage continued involvement or actions not advancing the conspiracy 
do not meet the “in furtherance” requirement.162 Therefore, Albert and 
Brandon chatting about how Charlie, another fellow coconspirator, “made a 
huge drop the other day” cannot meet the “in furtherance” requirement 
because Albert and Brandon are only speaking about past events. 
Again, to utilize the coconspirator exception, a conspiracy charge is not 
needed.163 “Subject to relevancy and similar considerations, out-of-court 
statements of a declarant coconspirator, if made during and in furtherance 
of a conspiracy, are admissible for the truth of the matter asserted, 
regardless of whether the conspiracy furthered is charged or 
uncharged. . . .”164 The statement is also admissible “regardless of whether 
it is identical to or different from the crime that the statements are offered to 
prove.”165 In general, 
[a]s long as it is shown that a party, having joined a conspiracy, 
is aware of the conspiracy’s features and general aims, 
statements pertaining to the details of plans to further the 
conspiracy can be admitted against the party even if the party 
does not have specific knowledge of the acts spoken of.166 
The acquittal of an alleged coconspirator does not preclude the trial 
judge from finding participation in a conspiracy.167 Thus, if those assertions 
are offered against a fellow coconspirator, the statements made may be 
allowed through a hearsay exception.168  
                                                                                                                 
 161. Id. at 515; United States v. Heidarpour, No. CR-11-109-M, 2012 WL 2825810, at 
*1 (W.D. Okla. July 10, 2012). 
 162. United States v. Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838, 845 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 163. United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1339 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 164. United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 196 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 165. Id.  
 166. United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 25 (1st Cir. 2002) (alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Angiulo, 847 F.2d 956, 969 (1st Cir. 1988), abrogated on other 
grounds by Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991)). 
 167. Id. at 18. 
 168. BINDER, supra note 90, § 35:12. 
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Overall, when admitting statements through the coconspirator exception, 
courts can have different understandings and applications of Rule 
801(d)(2)(E). For example, consider the Eighth Circuit’s decision in United 
States v. Smith.169 In Smith, four coconspirators (Leonard Smith, Myron 
Jackson, Russell Spearman, and Faustino Selvera) were involved in a large 
conspiracy to distribute heroin.170 Ike Conway was also involved in the 
conspiracy, but Conway worked as an informant for the government and 
was the primary witness at trial.171 In this case, Conway wore a body 
transmitter to record conservations between alleged conspiracy members, 
and a wiretap was also installed on Selvera’s phone.172 Smith concerned a 
conspiracy to distribute heroin where the appellants had challenged 
statements relating to the conspiracy and admitted into evidence via tape 
recordings.173  
The trial court admitted many of these tapes, including conversations 
between Conway and Jackson (referencing prior heroin deals), Conway and 
Selvera (referencing payments received from Smith), Conway and Smith 
(where Conway made attempts to set up meetings), Selvera and Smith (after 
Selvera had been warned by the Drug Enforcement Administration that he 
was going to be placed under surveillance), and a call from Smith to 
Selvera (explaining that Smith should not continue business there because 
he was under surveillance).174 The Eighth Circuit held that these statements 
were improperly admitted and those inadmissible statements were tested as 
to whether their admission reasonably contributed to the conviction.175  
The Eighth Circuit held that the recorded statements between Conway 
and Jackson were inadmissible because neither were still members of the 
conspiracy when the statements were made.176 This tape only concerned 
past dealings with Jackson and the remainder of Conway’s statements were 
“largely cumulative” as to the evidence used against them.177 The court, 
however, did find reversible error in the statements made between Conway 
and Smith because those improperly admitted statements could have 
reasonably contributed to his conviction.178 Two judges disagreed on how 
                                                                                                                 
 169. 578 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1978). 
 170. Id. at 1228. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1230. 
 173. Id. at 1228.  
 174. Id. at 1230. 
 175. Id. at 1233. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 1234. 
 178. Id. at 1234-35. 
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to apply both 801(d)(2)(E) and the reversible error standard on appeal. 
Judge Heaney wrote the opinion, and Judge Lay concurred in the judgment 
but viewed the application in another light.179 Judge Ross, on the other 
hand, provided yet another analysis, dissenting in the decision to grant a 
new trial to one of the defendants.180  
Like Judge Heaney, Judge Lay agreed that the tapes between Jackson 
and Conway were inadmissible since they were not members of the 
conspiracy at the time the statements were made.181 But Judge Lay agreed 
with the government “that the Selvera-Conway, Smith-Conway and Smith-
Selvera tapes were made during the course of the conspiracy and in 
furtherance of it.”182 He remarked on the necessary proof of the continued 
conspiracy between Selvera and Smith even after Conway’s arrest: 
“Selvera’s conversations with Smith create a permissible inference that the 
conspiracy between the two of them remained alive and that further drug 
distribution would take place when the opportunity presented itself.”183 
Judge Lay went even further in his analysis, stating that “even assuming the 
conspiracy had terminated, Smith’s statements would still be admissible 
against him as admissions against his interest. A conspirator’s statement 
made after a conspiracy has always been held admissible against the 
declarant as an admission against interest.”184 Overall, he concluded that 
even if those taped conversations were admissible, they constituted 
harmless error as to Smith.185 Yet another judge, Judge Ross, viewed this 
differently. 
Judge Ross agreed with Judge Lay that a conspiracy existed and 
continued between Selvera and Smith even after the departure of Spearman 
and Jackson and after Conway’s arrest.186 But Judge Ross believed that “the 
statements made by either Selvera or Smith in the furtherance of the 
conspiracy were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of 
                                                                                                                 
 179. Id. at 1236 (Lay, J., concurring); see also id. at 1239 (Ross, J., concurring and 
dissenting in part) (“I agree with Judge Lay that the conspiracy, at least as between Smith 
and Selvera, continued after Spearman and Jackson left it and after Conway’s arrest. 
Therefore, the statements made by either Selvera or Smith in the furtherance of the 
conspiracy were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”). 
 180. Id. at 1239 (Ross, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 181. Id. at 1236-37 (Lay, J., concurring).  
 182. Id. at 1237. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 1238. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 1239 (Ross, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Evidence.”187 Judge Ross distinguished the statements, determining the 
relevancy as to whom each statement was made because “[e]ven though 
Conway’s tape recorded statements to Smith and Selvera, after the 
conspiracy terminated as to Conway, were inadmissible, tape recorded 
statements by either Smith or Selvera, to each other or to Conway, were 
admissible. Both defendants made statements incriminating Smith.”188 
Although the taped recordings in Smith did not involve a tape-recorded 
prison phone call, the analysis used is similar to what can be used in 
admitting statements taken from a prison phone call. Judges look at each 
aspect and can come to different conclusions as illustrated by Smith. As 
Judge Lay mentioned, the concept of the 801(d)(2)(A) party-opponent 
admission can kick in if the statements are found not to be “in furtherance” 
of the conspiracy.189 Therefore, the inmate must be aware of Rule 
801(d)(2)(A), because a singular statement or admission of the inmate can 
be introduced if the statement “was made by the party in an individual or 
representative capacity.”190 As noted in Part II, the individual party-
opponent admission provides an easier way to admit statements and should 
thus be ruled out before jumping to coconspirator statements, unless the 
prosecutor is attempting to perform an evidentiary catchall, penalizing both 
the declarant and the defendant alike for their statements made on the phone 
call. 
IV. Comprehensive Overview for Admitting Prison Phone Calls Through 
the Coconspirator Hearsay Exception 
To admit prison phone calls under the coconspirator hearsay exception, 
the preliminary foundational determinations must be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence at the trial court level.191 To review, those 
preliminary questions are (1) that a conspiracy existed, (2) the declarant and 
the party against whom the statement is offered were members of the 
conspiracy, (3) the statement was made in the course of the conspiracy, and 
(4) the statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy.192 Each of 
these elements must be introduced prior to admission for each individual 
statement.193 The phone call cannot be introduced as a whole.194 
                                                                                                                 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 1240 (emphasis added). 
 189. See supra text accompanying note 184. 
 190. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). 
 191. See supra text accompanying note 67. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (defining statement in its singular form). 
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Often the facts introduced to establish each statement can overlap with 
each of the foundational determinations. The first preliminary question 
establishes the existence of a conspiracy. For an inmate, the existence of a 
conspiracy can be challenging to establish because it is often thought that 
the individual’s actions and participation with the conspiracy end once 
apprehended. As Part III explained, some courts split on this approach. But 
a simple framework exists that prosecutors should follow to determine the 
existence of a conspiracy, which can easily be met. 
To establish the existence of a conspiracy, the first question is: How 
large of a conspiracy is alleged?195 This is an easy place to begin because 
prosecutors should be able to approximate the size of the conspiracy before 
trial.196 If the conspiracy is large, officers or detectives may be working 
alongside the prosecution team and can provide general estimates of the 
size of the conspiracy.197 This can help prosecutors immensely, as they are 
only required to establish the existence and members of the conspiracy 
prior to the close of the trial, not at the beginning.198 Therefore, prosecutors 
may be able to establish each individual’s participation as the evidence 
comes into play and not worry about this burden up front.199 
Another important inquiry for prosecutors to consider is: To whom is the 
statement being offered against? This question is imperative because it 
requires separate concerns for a statement brought against an incarcerated 
prisoner as compared to a declarant on the other end of the phone line. As 
seen in the above examples, if incarcerated Albert calls Brandon, a fellow 
coconspirator, and tells him he sold drugs to Charlie, the prosecutor would 
not have to establish the statement as a coconspirator admission and could 
bring this statement in as an individual party-opponent admission under 
801(d)(2)(A).200 But if the prosecutor determines she wants to use 
statements made by the declarant on the phone line, she must utilize the 
                                                                                                                 
 194. See id. In theory, the entire phone call may be introduced if each statement meets 
the necessary requirements, but this is unlikely to be the case. 
 195. Ideally, prosecutors can anticipate the size of the conspiracy before bringing the 
suit. 
 196. Coconspirators should have a rough estimate on the general size of the conspiracy if 
they are being held accountable for all actions of other coconspirators. 
 197. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
 198. See supra text accompanying note 93. 
 199. “However, if the evidence is not introduced by the end of the prosecution’s case, a 
mistrial may be required.” GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[D]. 
 200. See supra Section II.B. 
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hearsay exception regarding coconspirator admissions under 
801(d)(2)(E).201 
The next preliminary determination is to establish that the declarant and 
defendant were members of the conspiracy. This element is similar to 
establishing the existence of a conspiracy, but the timing of the conspiracy 
itself carries more importance at this level. The main question to consider in 
this section is: Did the conspiracy end for the incarcerated defendant? Here, 
timing is important based on the underlying conspiracy charge.202 For 
example, in a conspiracy to commit a murder, the conspiracy likely ended 
for the incarcerated inmate once apprehended because the inmate will not 
be able to further the conspiracy while in prison, as concealing the murder 
will not constitute the main objective of the conspiracy. But compared with 
a drug conspiracy case, an incarcerated inmate remains able to continue the 
main objective. In prison, one could socialize with other prisoners and 
negotiate drug deals with those who may be getting out of jail soon. After 
making these negotiations, the prisoner could call a coconspirator and 
inform them to prepare for these new deals. Therefore, the prosecutor 
should look to the underlying conspiracy charge to assist her determination 
of whether the declarant and the defendant were members of the conspiracy 
after the defendant’s incarceration.  
Prosecutors must be aware that inmates want to establish themselves as 
outside of the conspiracy once incarcerated. If the prisoner withholds 
contact from coconspirators who are not incarcerated or if the prisoner was 
incarcerated on other grounds outside of the conspiracy, he may be able to 
convince courts that his participation has ended, and the prosecution bears 
the burden of showing that his acts prove otherwise. Keep in mind that this 
does not necessarily free the inmate from all liability, as the court retains 
discretion.203  
Whether a coconspirator statement is admissible does not turn on 
whether the statement was made between coconspirators.204 This situation 
likely only arises in few circumstances. An example of this would be a 
prisoner who passes along a statement to his unknowing family member 
who is not involved in the conspiracy and that family member later 
                                                                                                                 
 201. There may be a limited situation where the prosecutor can gain access to the calls 
for the purpose of catching the declarant on the hook for a party admission, but it has many 
opportunities to fail because the defendants may challenge the purpose for obtaining the 
prison records. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25. 
 202. See supra text accompanying notes 121, 123-25. 
 203. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
 204. See supra text accompanying note 86. 
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communicates that statement to someone involved in the conspiracy who 
recognizes what it means through code or slang. This situation makes it 
difficult to establish the statement because the prosecutor would need 
familiarity with all facts of the case, the other members involved in the 
conspiracy, and typical slang or code words used. Stated another way, 
Albert tells his mother, Bernice, to speak with Charlie and tell him, “Danny 
started drinking milk205 again, and I think Charlie and I should too.” This 
statement could be construed as a coconspirator statement made during and 
in furtherance of the conspiracy, but if Bernice were to testify regarding this 
statement at trial, then it would be inadmissible hearsay unless the 
prosecutor could show that the statement was either an individual party 
admission and provide additional corroborating evidence to support the 
significance of the statement, or as a coconspirator admission made by 
Albert himself. 
Another preliminary determination the prosecutor must consider is 
whether the statement was made during the course of the conspiracy.206 
This determination hinges on the existence of a conspiracy that both the 
declarant and the defendant were a part of at the time the statement was 
made.207 Therefore, this question will only be raised if (1) there was a 
conspiracy capable of continuing and (2) the conspiracy continued after 
incarceration. Part III provided examples based on the main objective of the 
conspiracy. To recap, if the main objective has been completed, the 
conspiracy cannot continue in prison.208 Consider another example of this: 
Albert and Brandon engage in a conspiracy to commit fraudulent stock 
transfers. Albert was arrested because he violated the Securities Exchange 
Act through his workplace and called Brandon from the prison to discuss 
business. During the call, Albert told Brandon to commit a few more 
fraudulent stock transfers, falling within the scope of during the course of 
the conspiracy. This example could also be used to satisfy the “in 
furtherance” requirement of a conspiracy209 because it involves a statement 
made to induce further action on the part of the conspirators,210 thus 
                                                                                                                 
 205. Brad Hamilton, A to Z: Deadly Slang by Gangs of New York, N.Y. POST (Oct. 28, 
2012, 4:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2012/10/28/a-to-z-deadly-slang-by-gangs-of-new-york/ 
(defining “drinking milk” as a gang term “for targeting or killing a rival”).  
 206. See supra Section III.C. 
 207. See supra text accompanying note 79. 
 208. See supra text accompanying note 114. 
 209. See supra Section III.D. 
 210. See supra text accompanying notes 159, 161. 
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illustrating how the same statement might be used to establish different 
preliminary determinations.  
V. Conclusion 
Prison phone calls offer prosecutors a potential evidentiary cash cow in a 
criminal trial. If a prosecutor wonders what a defendant may be discussing 
via prison phone calls, she must subpoena the prison and outline reasonable 
expectations of what she may find to satisfy the court. She may be able to 
introduce statements made by an individual party-opponent or she may be 
able to introduce the statements through the coconspirator admission, so 
long as she can satisfy the preliminary determinations despite likely 
objections from defense counsel. Laying out these requirements allows 
prosecutors to determine precisely how they may benefit from filtering 
through these valuable calls. More likely than not, prosecutors can use this 
evidence to strengthen their cases and win big. 
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